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Parent-Child Tort Immunity in Illinois
1.

INTRODUCTION

In 1891, the Supreme Court of Mississippi first developed the
doctrine of parent-child tort immunity.' In its original form, the
doctrine precluded tort actions between a parent and an unemancipated child for personal injuries.' Based primarily upon a policy of
preserving the family relationship,' parental immunity once enjoyed almost universal acceptance in American courts.4 In recent
1. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). Although there were no
English decisions concerning parental immunity, there is no reason to think that English
law would not permit actions for personal torts by a child against a parent. See W.
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 122, at 904 (5th ed. 1984). There are
decisions in Canada, see, e.g., Deziel v. Deziel, 1 D.L.R. 651 (1953), and Scotland, see,
e.g., Young v. Rankin, 1934 Sess. Cass. 499, holding that such an action will lie. See also
Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband& Wife-Parent &
Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 182 (1961).
"Parent-child immunity" in its overall application applies to both child defendants and
parent defendants. The focus of this comment, however, is on civil suits in which an
injured child sues a parent for personal injuries and the parent is, arguably, protected
from suit by the doctrine. Accordingly, the terms "parent-child immunity" and "parental immunity" will be used interchangeably herein.
2. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111
Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
3. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
4. Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem.,
235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Purcell v. Frazer, 7 Ariz. App. 5, 435 P.2d 736 (1967);
Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal.
678, 300 P. 7 (1931); Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974) (en banc);
Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d
669 (Del. 1976); Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Wright v.
Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610
P.2d 560 (1980); Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 161 Ind.
App. 497, 316 N.E.2d 455 (1974); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105
(1968); Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954); Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29
(Me. 1966); Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930); Luster v. Luster, 299
Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926);
Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924); Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703,
9 So. 885 (1891); Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953); Pullen v. Novak,
169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959); Strong v. Strong, 70 Nev. 290, 267 P.2d 240 (1954);
Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J.
247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Nahas v. Noble, 77 N.M. 139, 420 P.2d 127 (1966); Sorrentino
v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118
S.E. 12 (1923); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966);
Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771
(1964); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I.
131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930); McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636
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years, however, the doctrine has undergone a gradual process of
interpretation, exception, and eventual elimination.5
Today, the majority of jurisdictions have discarded the doctrine
of parent-child tort immunity or substantially restricted its application.6 However, these jurisdictions have failed to agree upon a
standard of liability to govern parent-child tort litigation.7 As a
result, there is no comprehensive framework by which the rights
and liabilities of parent and child can be developed. Furthermore,
it is unclear under what circumstances an injured child may maintain an action against his tortfeasor parent.
After reviewing the development and eventual decline of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, this comment will focus on the
development and current status of parental immunity in Illinois.
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Norfolk S. R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934);
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905); Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156
S.E. 750 (1931); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo.
29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954); see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:571 (West 1965) (parental immunity adopted by statute).
5. Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liabilityfor Prenatal
Injuries to Her Children Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 334 (1984).
6. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 89,
471 P,2d 282, 285 (1970) (en banc); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 923, 479 P.2d 648,
654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 294 (1971) (en banc); Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682, 684 (Del.
1979); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066,
1070 (Fla. 1982); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 205-06, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15
(1968); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 788-89 (Iowa 1981); Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 767, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980); Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross,
346 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Ky. 1961); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 640 (Me. 1979); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 368-69, 339 N.E.2d 907, 916 (1975); Transamerica Ins.
Co. v. Royale, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (Mont. 1983); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199
N.W.2d 169, 172 (1972); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980); Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev.
397, 405, 528 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1974); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 440, 224 A.2d 588,
591 (1966); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 507, 267 A.2d 490, 494 (1970);
Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 27, 28-29, 627 P.2d 869, 870 (1981); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (1969);
Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 330, 474 N.E. 2d 275, 278 (1984); Unah v.
Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Okla. 1984); Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d 776,
785-86 (1984); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 379, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971); Silva v. Silva,
446 A.2d 1013, 1016 (R.I. 1982); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 137, 268 S.E.2d 109, 112
(1980); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971); Smith v. Kaufman,
212 Va. 181, 186, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121-22, 370
A.2d 191, 193 (1977); Merrick v.Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893
(1980); (en banc); Lee v.Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va. 1976); Goller v.White, 20
Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963); see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572(c)
(West Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-539.21 (1983), amended by Sess. L. No.
201 (July 17, 1985).
For an excellent summary of the current status of parent-child tort immunity, see Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tenn. 1985) (Drowata, J., dissenting).
7. See infra notes 112-55 and accompanying text.
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Next, various alternatives to parental immunity will be discussed.

In particular, the reasonable parent standard will be analyzed to
determine whether such a standard effectively balances both a
child's right to be compensated for personal injuries and a parent's
discretion in choosing how to raise his children. Finally, the author will conclude that Illinois should adopt a modified form of the
reasonable parent standard in place of the now outmoded doctrine
of parent-child tort immunity.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY

Unlike many rules of law applied by American courts, the parental immunity doctrine did not originate in the English common
law.' Instead, its origin lies in three American judicial opinions
sometimes referred to as the "great trilogy." 9 The first decision to
recognize the doctrine was Hewellette v. George.I0
In Hewellette, a minor child brought an action against her
mother for false imprisonment. The mother had maliciously com12
mitted her daughter to an insane asylum." Citing no authority,
the court reversed a lower court ruling in favor of the child and
held that the child could not maintain an action against her mother
in tort.' 3 The court reasoned that the peace of society and a public
8. See supra note 1; see also McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation,
43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1054-63 (1930).
9. See Comment, supra note 1, at 182.
10. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). The remainder of the great trilogy are McKelvey
v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W.664 (1903), and Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79
P. 788 (1905). In McKelvey, a minor child brought suit to recover damages for mistreatment by her father and stepmother. Recognizing a parent's right to control and chastise
a child, 111 Tenn. at 388, 77 S.W.at 664, the court held that the child's sole remedy was
resort to the criminal laws for punishment of the parents' gross misconduct. Id. at 393,
77 S.W. at 665. Additionally, the court analogized parental immunity to spousal immunity. Id. at 389, 77 S.W. at 665; see infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
In Roller, a minor daughter sought damages against her father for rape. The daughter
argued that since the family had already dissolved, parental immunity would not further
family harmony. 37 Wash. at 242-43, 79 P. at 788-89. The court held that a minor child
cannot recover from its parents in tort. Id. Additionally, the court stated that recovery
should be denied because: (i) the tortfeasor parent could reacquire the child's damage
recovery if the child predeceased the parent, in violation of the prohibition against a
tortfeasor profiting from his wrong, 37 Wash. at 243, 79 P. at 789; see infra notes 59-61
and accompanying text; and (ii) payment to the injured child would deplete the parent's
assets to the detriment of the plaintiff child's siblings. 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
11. 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887; see infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
12. Prior to Hewellette, there were a few decisions addressing the issue of one standing in loco parentis to a child, but these decisions were ignored by Hewellette and subsequent decisions. See Comment, Child v. Parent.- Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19
HASTINGS L.J. 201, 202 (1967).
13. 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
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policy designed to maintain the family relationship preclude an injured minor from
bringing a tort action against a parent for per14
sonal injuries.

After Hewellette, the majority of American jurisdictions recognized the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity.15 In upholding
parental immunity, courts advanced a variety of justifications for
the doctrine. 16 The majority of these justifications have been
soundly criticized." However, in order to evaluate properly the
continued viability of parental immunity and the alternatives to the
doctrine,"s it is necessary to review these justifications.
The most commonly advanced justification for parental immunity is the theory that the doctrine promotes the peace and tranquility of the family and encourages the smooth functioning and
integrity of the family unit.' 9 This justification, first advanced by
the court in Hewellette,20 is based upon the belief that despite the
harm inflicted or the injury suffered, it is more disruptive to domestic tranquility and family harmony to allow a child to sue his par14. The court stated:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public
policy, designed to subserve the repose of families, and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a
claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
15. See supra note 4. In 1895, parental immunity became the law in Illinois. Foley v.
Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895). See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
16. For a summary of the justifications see Beal, supra note 5, at 335. See also Hollister, Parent-ChildImmunity. A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV.
489, 495-96 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Hollister, supra note 16, at 496; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 8.11, 13.4 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th
ed. 1971); Comment, The "Reasonable Parent"Standard:An Alternative to Parent Child
Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795, 805 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Reasonable
Parent];Comment, ParentalImmunity: The Casefor Abrogation of ParentalImmunity in
Florida,25 U. FLA. L. REV. 794 (1973).

18. See infra notes 112-54 and accompanying text.
19. See Mathis v. Ammons, 453 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Myers v. Tranquility Irrigation Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (1938); Strahorn v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956); Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); London Guar. &
Accident Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.
Super. 294, 176 A.2d 813 (1962); Nahas v. Noble, 77 N.M. 139, 420 P.2d 127 (1966);
Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67
(Okla. 1964); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Logan v. Reaves, 209
Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 (1962); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis.
260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
20. 68 Miss. at 705, 9 So. at 887.
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ent than to deny such child a cause of action in tort.2'
While the preservation of family harmony and cooperation is a
social concern worthy of protection, the parental immunity doctrine is not the best way to promote it. The theory that an uncompensated tort preserves family tranquility and respect for the
parent, even in a family in which rape, brutal beatings or other
inhumane treatment have already occurred, is wholly untenable.22
Additionally, where liability insurance exists, as is the case in most
intrafamily litigation,23 allowing a recovery in tort eliminates the
family's financial burden of caring for an injured child, and thus
promotes rather than disrupts family harmony.24
Another justification for parental immunity, similar to the family harmony justification, is the argument that the doctrine preserves parental authority and discipline.25 Parents have the right
and obligation to control, support, protect, guide and educate their
child.26 The child has a reciprocal obligation to obey his parents.27
Proponents of this theory argue that if a parent is to have the authority needed to discipline his child, acts committed by the parent
21. See Comment, ParentalImmunity: Mississippi's Gift to the American Family, 7
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 597, 605 (1971).
22. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 122, at 866; Hollister, supra note 16, at 502.
23. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, PROPERTY/CASUALTY FACT BOOK
(1985-1986).
24. See Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971); Badigian v.
Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 479, 174 N.E.2d 718, 723, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 41 (1961) (Fuld, J.,
dissenting); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963); see also
Peterson v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 488, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1970). In fact,
the existence of liability insurance has been found to be a prerequisite to such an intrafamily suit in a number of jurisdictions.
The following cases permit a child to recover damages from his parents for injuries
sustained in automobile accidents only to the extent of the parent's automobile liability
insurance coverage: Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976); Ard v. Ard, 414 So.
2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Unah
v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dept., 672 P.2d
810 (Wyo. 1983).
However, as the Supreme Court of Oregon has noted, "[a] person's liability in our law
still remains the same whether or not he has liability insurance; properly, the provision
and cost of such insurance varies with potential liability under the law, not the law with
the cost of insurance." Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d 776, 784 n.9 (1984); accord
Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Tenn. 1985) (Drawota, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 717-18, 156 N.W.2d 105, 108-09
(1968); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951); Cannon v. Cannon,
287 N.Y. 425, 428, 40 N.E.2d 236, 237-38 (1942); Gunn v. Rollings, 250 S.C. 302, 305,
157 S.E.2d 590, 591 (1967); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 262, 212 N.W. 787, 787 (1927).
26. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); McKelvey v. McKelvey,
S11Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
27. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); McKelvey v. McKelvey,
111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); see also Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12
(1923).
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that would be tortious if directed toward someone else cannot be
considered tortious when directed toward his child.28
However, courts have recognized exceptions to the parental immunity doctrine 29 and have not, therefore, allowed parental authority and discipline to remain unchecked. For example, courts
which approve the doctrine have nonetheless refused to apply it
where a child is injured by a parent's willful and wanton misconduct.3" Thus, even in jurisdictions which have approved the doctrine, parental authority is not unlimited.31 Moreover, parental
authority and discipline are routinely controlled through state
criminal laws,3 2 which provide for remedies including removal of a
child from the home or termination of parental rights altogether.33
It is apparent, therefore, that regardless of a state's position regarding parent-child tort actions, there exist significant restraints on the
exercise of parental authority.
Because of these limitations, parental authority and discipline
would not be substantially impaired by abrogation of parent-child
tort immunity. However, the elimination of parental immunity
would impair a parent's discretion in deciding how to raise a child.
28. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292
(1971). For example, a parent may spank a child who has misbehaved without being
liable for battery, or he may order the child to stay in his room as punishment, yet not be
held responsible for false imprisonment. Id.
29. The development of parental immunity illustrates the "orthodox process of judicial legislation by exception, elaboration and interpretation." Comment, supra note 1, at
217; Beal, supra note 5, at 334. Some of the most common exceptions allow recovery
when: (1) the child or parent dies before the commencement of the action; (2) the parent
was engaged in vocational or business activity at the time of the injury; (3) the parent
intentionally injured the child; or (4) a third party files suit against a parent for contribution. See Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066 (1981) (reviewing the development and decline of
parental immunity). For a discussion of the exceptions to parental immunity which have
developed in Illinois, see infra notes 70-109 and accompanying text.
30. See Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982); Nudd
v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99
N.W.2d 16 (1959); Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1974) (dictum).
31. See, e.g., Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 I11.
2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
32. See Comment, Due Process For Parents in Emergency Protection Proceedings
Under the Texas Family Code-Suggestionsfor Improving the System, 15 Hous. L. REV.
709, 713-14 (1978); Note, Termination of Parental Rights--Suggested Reforms and Responses, 16 J. FAM. L. 239, 242-44 (1977-1978). Every state provides for court intervention in the family setting to protect children. See Hollister, supra note 16, at 506; Katz,
Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L. Q. 1, 10-11 (1975).
33. "Courts routinely intervene when the parent's conduct is criminal or when the
child's physical or mental health is endangered." Hollister, supra note 16, at 506. Courts
remove approximately 75,000 children per year from their parents' homes. Wald, State
Intervention on Behalfof "Neglected" Children: Standardsfor Removal of Childrenfrom
Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 625, 625-26 (1976).
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Given the nation's ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, it becomes difficult if not impossible to develop a-standard which protects a parent's child-raising choices.34 Moreover, an adversarial
proceeding may not be the appropriate vehicle for resolution of
these concerns.3 5
Another frequently cited justification for parental immunity relates to the doctrine of spousal immunity.36 At common law,
spouses were considered a single entity, under the management
and control of the husband.37 Since the wife's legal entity merged
with the husband's, she retained no right to contract for herself,
convey real property, or sue or be sued without joinder of the husband.38 Consequently, because spouses were not independent legal
entities, they were immune from suit against one another.39
Some courts, analogizing parental immunity to spousal immunity, prohibited all intrafamily litigation.' However, these doctrines are similar only to the extent that they serve as bars to
34. See Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560, 563 (1980).
35. See Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 461 A.2d 1145 (1983). This rationale was announced in Justice Rogosheske's dissent in Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn.
1980):
First, the objective standard encourages parents to disparage the favored American principle of freedom of choice in family matters by holding out the possibility of an insurance recovery if a parent is willing to expose his conduct and
judgment to public scrutiny. Second, jury verdicts based on a reasonable parent
standard in this value-laden area do not inspire public confidence, since they
would necessarily substitute parental judgments based upon the individual juror's views of proper or ideal child-rearing practices. The tendency toward arbitrary and intrusive standards of good parenting . . . cannot be alleviated by
precise instructions . . . . Moreover, since the jury must consider the family
context and the parent is the best, and perhaps only, witness capable of expressing the personal, cultural and socio-economic principles by which he raises his
children, the danger of collusion is significant. These are not the type of claims
our adversary system of factfinding is equipped to impartially resolve, and the
parent's incentive for an opportunity to influence the result is so great as to
further undermine the process.
Id. at 602 (Rogosheske, J., dissenting). However, on balance, protecting a parent's discretion does not justify the retention of an absolute prohibition against parent-child civil
litigation. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
36. See generally Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband
and Wife, 15 MOD. L. REV. 133 (1952); McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between
Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303 (1959).
37. See generally Kahn-Freund, supra note 36; McCurdy, supra note 36. See also
Note, Intrafamilial Tort Immunity in New Jersey: Dismantling the Barrier to Personal
Injury Litigation, 10 RUT.-CAM. 661 (1979).
38. See Barnwell v. Cordle, 438 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1971); Callow v. Thomas, 322
Mass. 550, 78 N.E. 2d 637 (1948); Taylor v. Bullock, 111 N.H. 214, 279 A.2d 585 (1971);
see also Reasonable Parent, supra note 17, at 797.
39. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 122, at 860.
40. See, e.g., Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass.
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litigation between members of the same family. Unlike spousal immunity, parental immunity is not founded upon the single identity
of the parties.4 At common law, children were considered independent legal entities.42 Moreover, children were permitted to
maintain contract and property actions against their parents.43
The two doctrines are, therefore, fundamentally different. Additionally, the doctrine of spousal immunity has been abolished in a
majority of jurisdictions."
Parental immunity has also been justified as preserving the family exchequer.45 Some courts have stated that if an injured child is
allowed to recover from the parent and the child has siblings, the
resources available to the entire family will be reduced to compensate the injured child. As a result, the injured child's recovery will
be at the siblings' expense. 6
Those who argue that compensating an injured child depletes
the family treasury to the detriment of other family members have
not considered two points. First, whenever a defendant parent is
held liable for damages, his family treasury will be depleted at the
expense of the dependent children. 47 This is the inevitable result of
permitting recovery when the defendant is uninsured or insured in
an amount less than the damage award. Moreover, the transfer of
funds outside of the family unit to compensate an injured nonfamily plaintiff is a greater depletion of the family exchequer than a
transfer within the family. Second, where a negligent parent has
sufficient insurance to compensate the injured child, family funds
will not be depleted. Instead, recovery of damages will serve to
maintain the family's original standard of living.48
Another justification for the retention of parent-child tort immu480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903);
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 122, at 864.
42. See Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925); Crowley v. Crowley, 72
N.H. 241, 56 A. 190 (1903); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895).
43. See, e.g., Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 762, 611 P.2d 135, 137 (1980)
(dictum); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 356, 150 A. 905, 907 (1930); King v. Sells, 193
Wash. 294, 296, 75 P.2d 130, 131 (1938).
44. See W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 122, at 903.
45. See Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 1970).
46. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 156 A. 905 (1930); France v. A.P.A. Transp.
Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351
(1971).
47. Hollister, supra note 16, at 499.
48. Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768, 611 P.2d 135, 141-42 (1980);
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529,
531-32 (1969); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).

1986]

Parent-Child Tort Immunity

nity is the theory that allowing a child to maintain a tort action
against his parents promotes fraud and collusion. 49 The danger
that family members will conspire to defraud a liability insurance
carrier has often been cited as a reason for disallowance of parentchild tort litigation.5"
While the danger of fraud and collusion exists in any intrafamily
lawsuit, courts have not found this reason sufficient to bar tort
claims between husband and wife, 5 ' brother and sister,52
grandchild and grandparent, 53 or other family members.5

4

Addi-

tionally, the danger of fraud and collusion has not prevented courts
from allowing a child to maintain property and contract actions
against a parent.55 Moreover, courts have, despite this danger, permitted much parent-child tort litigation under the numerous exceptions to parental immunity.56 In any event, the threat of
collusion does not justify denying an entire class of litigants a civil
remedy for personal injuries.57
49. See, e.g., Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Luster
v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163
A.2d 147 (1960); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Borst v. Borst, 41
Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
50. The danger has been expressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court as follows:
[P]ractically speaking, an action is not going to be commenced unless the family
member to be sued is in effect prepared to say that he was negligent. The decision for the child to sue will be determined within the family circle and obviously the proposed defendant is going to participate in making it, quite an
unorthodox situation under our basic concept of adversary litigation, to say the
least. The risk of collusion is indeed a very great and human one, when the
insured's own flesh and blood and the family pocketbook are concerned.
Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 252, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (1960).
51. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52. Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960); Rozell v. Rozell,
281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254, 13 N.Y.S. 281 (1939); Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super.
383, 57 A.2d 426 (1948).
53. Wilkins v. Kane, 74 N.J. Super. 414, 181 A.2d 417 (1962).
54. Herrel v. Haney, 207 Tenn. 532, 341 S.W.2d 574 (1960) (brother against brother);
Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960) (brother against brother).
55. Mathis v. Ammons, 453 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925); Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N.H. 241, 56 A. 190
(1903); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895).
56. See Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955) (en banc)
(emancipated child suing parent); Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640
App. 3d
(1963) (vocational or business activity exception); Cummings v. Jackson, 57 I11.
68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978) (breach of duty owed general public exception); Smith v.
Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971) (motor vehicle operation exception); Sisler
v. Seeberger, 23 Wash. App. 612, 596 P.2d 1362 (1979) (death of parent exception). For
a discussion of the exceptions to parental immunity in Illinois, see infra notes 70-109 and
accompanying text.
57. As one commentator has noted, "[a]ny rule that seeks to incidentally avoid fraud
by withholding legal protection from all claimants, regardless of the justice of their
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A final5" justification for parental immunity is the argument that
an injured child should be denied recovery against a tortfeasor parent because the parent may reacquire the damage award.59 This
possibility will occur only if the child both dies intestate and predeceases the parent. 60 Some courts have stated that if the parent were
to inherit the child's damage award, this would violate the rule
that a tortfeasor may not profit from his wrong.61
62
Like the danger of fraud and collusion, the remote possibility
that the parent may reacquire the award cannot justify denying an
injured child compensation against his tortfeasor parent. After
closer examination, this argument can be considered no more than
an "after-the-fact" or "makeweight" justification for parental immunity. 63 Even where this possibility occurs, the tortfeasor parent
will not profit from the wrong but, instead, will have returned to
him only that part of the damage award which is no longer necessary to compensate the child. 64 On balance, it is unjust to deny an
claims, employs a medieval technique which, however satisfying it may be to defendants
• . .is scarcely in keeping with the acknowledged function of a modem legal system."
Hollister, supra note 16, at 501; see also Leflar & Sanders, Mental Suffering and Its Consequence-Arkansas Law, 7 U. ARK. L. ScH. BULL. 43, 60 (1939).
58. Another rationale in support of parental immunity has been advanced. It may be
argued that parental immunity acknowledges the physical, mental or financial weakness
of parents. For example, a parent may be financially unable to provide a reasonably safe
home. See Hollister, supra note 16, at 507 (criticizing this rationale); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 32, at 151-54. This rationale does not appear to have received any
judicial support.
59. See Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 722, 156 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1968); Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Or. 282, 299, 218 P.2d 445, 452 (1950) (en banc); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash.
242, 245, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905).
2-1(d) (1983).
60. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
61. See Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 722, 156 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1968); Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Or. 282, 299, 218 P.2d 445, 452 (1950) (en banc); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash.
242, 245, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905).
62. Such a sequence of events is highly unlikely. Even if an intestate child predeceased the parent, all of the compensatory funds might have been spent prior to the
child's death. See Reasonable Parent,supra note 17, at 802 n.34; Hollister, supra note 16,
at 497.
63. A number of courts and commentators have noted that the possibility of inheritance by a tortfeasor has never limited recovery for improper conduct with respect to
intrafamilial property actions. See, e.g., Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292
(1925); McKlain v. McKlain, 80 Okla. 113, 194 P. 894 (1921); Comment, ParentalImmunity: California'sAnswer, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 179, 186; Comment, supra note 12, at
205.
64. The chance of inheritance by the parents would be less remote where the child
dies as a result of the parent's negligence. In such a case, the child's estate would sue the
negligent parent for wrongful death. The parent, as next of kin, could be a beneficiary of
the child's estate and could thus profit from his wrong if insurance proceeds were involved. See Reasonable Parent, supra note 17, at 802 n.34. Courts have dealt with this
problem in the context of wrongful death actions. In a wrongful death action against a
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injured minor child compensation because the child may eventually have to give part of the recovery back.
The arguments advanced in support of parental immunity no
longer justify retention of the doctrine. As a result, the majority of
courts have either totally abolished the doctrine or have significantly limited its application. 65 In Illinois the doctrine has undergone substantial alteration which renders uncertain its continued
viability.
III.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF PARENT-CHILD
TORT IMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS

Illinois was among the first states to recognize the doctrine that
an unemancipated minor child cannot maintain an action against a
parent for damages resulting from maltreatment. 6 This absolute
prohibition against parent-child tort litigation remained the law in
Illinois until 1956,67 when the gradual erosion of parental immunity began.68 The continued development of the doctrine in Illinois
has been marked by the creation of piecemeal exceptions to the
absolute prohibition against parent-child tort actions. 69 This process has created a body of case law characterized by uneven and
irreconcilable precedents.
A.

Willful and Wanton Misconduct
In 1956, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized the first of five
exceptions to the parental immunity doctrine.70 In Nudd v. Matthird party where one of the beneficiaries of the estate contributed to the death, recovery
is denied where the wrongdoer is the sole beneficiary. See Hall v. United States, 381 F.
Supp. 224 (D.S.C. 1974); see also Sheley v. Guy, 29 Ill. App. 3d 361, 330 N.E.2d 567
(1975) (applying ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 2 (1975); negligent beneficiary excluded from
sharing in recovery).
65. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
66. Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895). In Foley, a minor child brought suit
against his uncle for mistreatment. The child was under the care of the uncle. Id. at 578.
The court held that it was "doubtless the law," that a child could not maintain an action
against a parent for damages on account of mistreatment, whether the relation was created by blood or adoption. Id. at 580; see also Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill.
App. 164 (1933).
67. See Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
68. See infra notes 70-110 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 70-110 and accompanying text. See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.
4th 1066, 1093-1113 (1981).
70. The five exceptions which have developed in Illinois are: (1) allegations of willful
and wanton misconduct by one family member against another, see infra notes 71-77 and
accompanying text; (2) infliction of injury during activity outside the family relationship,
see infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text; (3) breach of a duty owed the general public, see infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text; (4) dissolution of the family relationship
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soukas,7 the defendant was sued by his minor son for injuries allegedly occurring as a result of the defendant's willful and wanton
conduct72 in driving his automobile at an excessive speed on a wet,
foggy night.7 3 The complaint alleged that the defendant maintained liability insurance and had relinquished all rights and interest in any benefit deriving from his child's claim.74 The court held
that parental immunity does not bar a minor child from maintaining an action against his parents for injuries caused by the parent's
willful and wanton misconduct.75 The court reasoned that parental immunity was adopted to promote family unity and that
preventing a child from obtaining redress for willful and wanton
misconduct does not further such a policy. 6 The court also stated
that tolerance of such misconduct would not foster family unity
but, instead, would deprive a child of redress without offering any
corresponding social benefit.77
B. Activity Beyond the Family Purpose
In Schenck v. Schenck,"8 the court developed the "beyond the
family purpose" exception to parental immunity. In Schenck, a
father sued his unemancipated seventeen-year-old daughter after
the daughter negligently ran her automobile into him as he crossed
a public street.7 9 The court held that a parent or child may maintain an intrafamily suit for injuries sustained during an activity
arising outside of the family relationship. s0 The court stated that
the parent-child immunity doctrine applies only to conduct which
arises from the family relationship and is directly related to family
purposes and objectives. 81 Therefore, because the father's injuries
through death, see infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text; and (5) contribution claims
between a third party and a negligent parent, see infra notes 101-09 and accompanying
text.
71. 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
72. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 14.01 (2d ed. 1971), define willful
and wanton misconduct as "a course of action which [shows actual or deliberate intention to harm or which, if not intentional,] shows an utter indifference to or conscious
disregard for a person's own safety [and] the safety of others."
73. 7 Ill. 2d at 610, 131 N.E.2d at 526.
74. Id., 131 N.E.2d at 526-27.
75. Id. at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 77 111. 2d 165, 395 N.E.2d 538
(1979); Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 63 Ill. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
78. 100 11. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968).
79. Id. at 200, 241 N.E.2d at 12.
80. Id. at 206, 241 N.E.2d at 15.
81. The court stated:
[T]here are no impelling reasons for eroding or emasculating the family immu-
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occurred during the exercise of his individual rights on the public
street, the immunity rule did not bar an action for those injuries.82
Since Schenck, Illinois courts have struggled with application of
this exception. 83 Recently, the exception was tested in Stallman v.
Youngquist,84 a case in which the plaintiff sustained prenatal injuries as a result of an automobile collision between her mother and
another motorist.85 The collision occurred while the mother was
driving to a restaurant.86 The plaintiff brought a negligence action
against her mother and the other motorist.8 7 The lower court dismissed the plaintiff's action against her mother because the activity-driving to a restaurant-arose from the family relationship
and was related to a family purpose.88 A divided appellate court
reversed the trial court and held that the plaintiff should be given
an opportunity to prove that the mother's act of driving to a restaurant was not an act arising from the family relationship and that
it was not directly connected with family purposes and objectives.89
The dissent argued that a family excursion in the family car had
long been considered a family purpose or objective and that parental immunity should therefore bar the child's action. 9° The dissent
nity rule for conduct of either parent or child arising out of the family relationship and directly connected with the family purposes and objectives in those
cases where it may be said that the carelessness, inadvertence or negligence is
but the product of the hazards incident to interfamily [sic] living and common
to every family. In such instances the immunity doctrine is neither unjust, unreasonable nor without a sound and solid foundation.
Id.
82. Id.
83. See Marsh v. McNeil, 136 Ill. App. 3d 616, 483 N.E.2d 595 (1985); Stallman v.
Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1984); Wilkosz v. Wilkosz, 124 Il.
App. 3d 904, 464 N.E.2d 1232 (1984); Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 104, 435 N.E.2d
770 (1982); Eisele v. Tenuta, 83 Ill. App. 3d 799, 404 N.E.2d 349 (1980); Illinois Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 83 Ill. App. 3d 234, 403 N.E.2d 1256 (1980); Cosmopolitan
Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Heap, 128 Ill. App. 2d 165, 262 N.E.2d 826 (1970).
84. 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1984).
85. Id. at 859, 473 N.E.2d at 400.
86. Id. at 861, 473 N.E.2d at 401.
87. Id. at 859, 473 N.E.2d at 400.
88. Id. at 860, 473 N.E.2d at 401.
89. Id. at 864, 473 N.E.2d at 403.
90. Id. at 866, 473 N.E.2d at 404-05 (Romiti, J., dissenting). The validity of this
conclusion is also illustrated by the recent case Marsh v. McNeil, 136 Ill. App. 3d 616,
483 N.E.2d 595 (1985). In Marsh, the Illinois Appellate Court applied the parent-child
tort immunity doctrine to bar a negligence action against a minor child by the estate of
her deceased parents. Id. at 621-23, 483 N.E.2d at 599-600. The court, in dismissing the
claim, held (i) that parent-child immunity bars claims by parents against their minor
children, Id. at 621, 483 N.E.2d at 598; (ii) that the "beyond the family purpose" exception to parental immunity was inapplicable where the auto accident occurred while the
parent was driving to a grocery store to purchase meat, Id. at 621, 483 N.E.2d at 599; (iii)
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concluded, however, that courts, instead of continually "chipping
away" at the parental immunity doctrine, should discard it outright so that the responsibilities of parents to their children could
be developed according to a comprehensive framework. 9'
C. Duty Owed to the General Public
In Cummings v. Jackson,9 2 the court recognized the public duty
exception to parent-child tort immunity. In Cummings, a minor
was struck by an automobile in front of her mother's property.
The minor filed suit against her mother alleging that the mother
negligently and in violation of a city ordinance failed to trim the
trees along her property line, thus obstructing the view of the
driver who struck the minor plaintiff.93 The court held that the
parent-child tort immunity doctrine did not bar plaintiff's action
against her mother94 because the mother's duty was owed to the
general public and was only incidentally related to the family
members living in the house. 9 5 Thus, under Cummings, the parent-child tort immunity doctrine does not apply
when a parent fails
96
to fulfill a duty owed to the general public.
D. Dissolution of the Family Relationship Through Death
A fourth exception to parent-child tort immunity is recognized
at the death of either the parent or the child. 97 Parental immunity
was originally developed to preserve family harmony and parental
control and discretion. 98 However, when the family relationship
has been dissolved by death, immunity no longer serves the stated
that if a child was unemancipated at the time the alleged tort was committed, the child
may not maintain a negligence action even though he is either emancipated or has attained majority at the time the action is commenced, Id. at 621-22, 483 N.E.2d at 599;
and (iv) that despite the fact that both parents were deceased, the parent-child immunity
doctrine applied where the defendant's sister was still alive. Id. at 622, 483 N.E.2d at
599.
91. Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 867, 373 N.E.2d at 405.
92. 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978).
93. Id. at 69, 372 N.E.2d at 1128.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Johnson v. Meyers, 2 I11.App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972). This exception is
also recognized in a number of other jurisdictions. See Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp.
413 (D.D.C. 1968); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962); Sisler v. Seeberger, 23 Wash. App. 612, 596
P.2d 1362 (1979).
98. See Johnson v. Meyers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 846, 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972); see
also supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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policy. 99 A suit brought by or against the estate of a deceased family member does not affect the family relationship or parental control and discretion. Consequently, the immunity doctrine does not
preclude a cause of action where a minor child sues the estate of a
deceased parent or the estate of a deceased child sues a living
parent. 100

E.

Contribution Claims Between a Third Party and the Parent

A final exception to the parent-child tort immunity doctrine has
been recognized where a third party seeks contribution from an
allegedly negligent parent. 10 ' In Larson v. Buschkamp,10 2 the
plaintiffs were passengers in an automobile driven by their father,
Robert Larson. The plaintiffs sustained injuries in a collision with
a car driven by the defendant, Helen Buschkamp. The plaintiffs'
mother filed suit against both Larson and Buschkamp alleging that
each driver negligently operated a motor vehicle. 10 3 Buschkamp
subsequently brought a counterclaim against Larson seeking contribution."° Larson moved to dismiss the original claim and the
counterclaim on the ground that parental immunity barred such
actions.105 The trial court dismissed both claims against Larson. 106
The appellate court, however, reversed the trial court as to the
counterclaim and held that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine did not bar a contribution claim against the father. 10 7 The
court reasoned that since the parental immunity doctrine bars direct tort suits between parent and child if the cause of action arises
during pursuit of a family purpose, the doctrine, and the policies
which support it, need not be applied against a third party so as to
99. Johnson v. Meyers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 846, 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972).
100. Id. However, this conclusion may be uncertain after the recent decision of
Marsh v. McNeil, 136 Ill. App. 3d 616, 483 N.E.2d 595 (1985), where the court distinguished the Johnson opinion and held that parent-child immunity applied to a suit
brought against a child by her deceased parents' estates. Id. at 622, 483 N.E.2d at 599.
Marsh appears to be inconsistent with the general trend restricting the application of
parent-child tort immunity. This opinion further illustrates the need to develop a more
consistent approach to intrafamilial tort litigation.
101. Aimone v. Walgreen's Co., 601 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. I11.1985); Hartigan v. Beery,
128 I11.App. 3d 195, 470 N.E.2d 571 (1984); Moon v. Thompson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 657,
469 N.E.2d 365 (1984); Larson v. Buschkamp, 105 I11.App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221
(1982).
102. 105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (1982).
103. Id. at 966, 435 N.E.2d at 222.
104. Id.; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302 (1981).
105. 105 Ill. App. 3d at 966, 435 N.E.2d at 223.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 970-71, 435 N.E.2d at 225-26.
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defeat an action for contribution.10 8 Therefore, parent-child tort
immunity does not impair a third party's right to seek contribution
from a negligent parent. 109

The above discussion of Illinois law illustrates that the development of parental immunity has been characterized by a gradual
erosion of the absolute prohibition. The numerous exceptions to
parent-child tort immunity render its continued viability questionable. Although Illinois continues to profess adherence to the doctrine of immunity, the trend has been to continually restrict rather
than expand application of the doctrine. 1 0 Illinois courts need to
reexamine the doctrine and its justifications.11 Such a reevaluation will illustrate the need for an alternative to parental immunity
as a standard governing parents' responsibilities to their children.
To date, jurisdictions which have limited the doctrine of parental
immunity have disagreed as to which alternative effectively governs parental conduct. Following is a review of various alternatives and an analysis of which approach most effectively balances
both a child's right to be compensated for personal injuries and a
parent's right to exercise discretion in child-raising.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE PARENT-CHILD TORT
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

A.

The Case-By-Case Approach

One alternative to blanket parental immunity involves the individual evaluation of cases to determine whether immunity is appropriate." 2 Generally, jurisdictions that utilize this alternative
108. Id. at 969-71, 435 N.E.2d at 223-26; Note, Larson v. Buschkamplx The Effect of
Contributionon the Parent-ChildTort Immunity Doctrine and its Implicationsfor Strict
Liability in Illinois, 14 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 533 (1983).
109. 105 Ill. App. 3d at 969-71, 435 N.E.2d at 223-26. But see Duensing v. Tripp,
596 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (applying Illinois law, the court held that Illinois would
not recognize negligent supervision action against parent; contribution action against parent therefore disallowed). Other jurisdictions which have considered whether an action
for contribution may be maintained against a contributorily negligent parent have not
been in agreement. See Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1978); Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175
(1955); Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966); Holodock v. Spencer, 36
N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
110. Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Il1. App. 3d 859, 864, 473 N.E.2d 400, 403 (1984).
But see Marsh v. McNeil, 136 Ill. App. 3d 616, 483 N.E.2d 595 (1985).
111. As one court has noted, the existence of exceptions to parental immunity moderates its harsh effect. However, this results in paradoxical and irreconcilable judicial decisions. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 377, 282 A.2d 351, 354 (1971).
112. See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz.
86, 89, 471 P.2d 282, 285 (1970); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560,
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hold that the proper approach to parent-child tort litigation is a
relaxation of the parental immunity doctrine." 3 Under this approach, immunity is not imposed unless a parent's conduct can be
characterized as the exercise of parental authority, discipline, supervision or discretion."1 4
This approach abolishes absolute parental immunity, yet it recognizes the importance of protecting a parent's exercise of authority and discretion. In jurisdictions which have adopted this
approach, parental immunity has become the exception to a general rule of liability. Consequently, the case-by-case approach suffers from the same shortcoming as the traditional approach which
imposes liability as the exception to immunity:" l5 it fails to provide
a comprehensive framework for determining the rights and liabilities of parent and child. Instead the court, in each case, must determine whether the parent's conduct can be characterized as an
exercise of parental authority or discretion. This approach creates
uncertainty as to the circumstances in which parental immunity
will be invoked.
B.

The Absence of Duty Approach

Another approach to determining parental liability was developed by the New York Court of Appeals in Holodock v. Spencer." 6
After New York eliminated parental immunity in 1969,117 the
court retreated from the impact of that position by holding that
parents have no legal duty to their children to supervise them
properly."' The court in Holodock concluded, however, that if
there is a breach of a recognized duty ordinarily owed apart from
564 (1980); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787-88 (Iowa 1981); Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 767, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d
634, 639-40 (Me. 1979); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 365-66, 339 N.E.2d 907,
916 (1975); Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Mo. 1979); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93
Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980).
113. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 365-66, 339 N.E.2d 907, 916
(1975).
114. See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 14 (Alaska 1967) (parental discipline, care and
control); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (1980) (parental supervision); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 788-90 (Iowa 1981) (parental authority
and discretion); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 770, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980)
(parental authority and discretion); Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. 1979)
(parental control and discipline).
115. Illinois follows the traditional approach. See supra notes 70-110 and accompanying text.
116. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
117. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 530-31 (1969).
118. Holodock, 36 N.Y.2d at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
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the family relationship, the law will not withhold its sanctions
merely because the parties are parent and child." 9
The failure to recognize a parental duty to supervise children is
unjustifiable. It is paradoxical to hold that other relationships involve a duty properly to supervise a child,"2 ' but that a parent does
not owe such a duty to his own child. 2 ' Additionally, while parental immunity only prohibits direct tort actions between parent and
child, a holding that a parent has no legal duty means that the
conduct is no longer tortious. 22 Even states which recognize parental immunity allow a third party, sued by a child, to seek contribution from a negligent parent. 23 Yet, under Holodock, a
contributorily negligent third party will have to compensate fully
the injured child because the contributorily negligent parent is absolved from liability. 24 This inequitable result renders the New
York approach an unacceptable alternative to parental immunity.
C. The Limited Application Approach
The limited application alternative was first developed by the
119. Id. at 50-51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72.
120. See, e.g., Standifer v. Pate, 291 Ala. 434, 282 So. 2d 261 (1973) (babysitters);
McGovern v. Riverdale Country Sch. Realty Co., 51 A.D.2d 894, 380 N.Y.S.2d 687
(1976) (school); Oakley v. State, 38 A.D.2d 998, 329 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1972) (school), affd
mem. 32 N.Y.2d 773, 298 N.E.2d 120, 344 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1973); Kearney v. Roman
Catholic Church of St. Paul, 31 A.D.2d 541, 542, 295 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (1968) (Boy
Scout leaders); Barrera v. General Elec. Co., 84 Misc. 2d 901, 378 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1975) (grandparents).
121. See, e.g., Holodock, 36 N.Y.2d at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 872;
accord Middleton v. Nichols, 114 Misc. 2d 596, 452 N.Y.S.2d 157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982);
Kaplan v. Vavasseur, 101 Misc. 2d 519, 421 N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). But see
Goedkoop v. Ward Pavement Corp., 51 A.D.2d 542, 378 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1976) (parent
negligently permitted child to play near blasting caps); Aquaviva v. Piazzolla, 117 Misc.
2d 581, 458 N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (duty to supervise a child recognized).
Illinois courts have not specifically addressed the question of whether a parent may be
liable to his child or a third party for negligent supervision. However, in Duensing v.
Tripp, 596 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ill. 1984), a federal district court held that Illinois, if faced
with this issue, would not recognize such an action against a parent.
122. An immunity does not establish that a defendant's conduct is not tortious; it
simply absolves him from liability. See Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 239, 330 A.2d
335, 341 (1974); W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 134, at 970. However, failing to recognize
a duty does more than absolve the parent from liability; it establishes that the conduct is
not tortious. Hollister, supra note 16, at 517.
123. Larson v. Buschkamp, 105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (1982).
124. Justice Jason noted this point in a dissent to Holodock: "[T]hat the non-parent
defendant should bear the full loss to which the parent has contributed runs counter to
the evolution in our law which is toward a system of comparative fault." 36 N.Y.2d at 53,
324 N.E.2d at 348, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (Jason, J., dissenting).

1986]

Parent-Child Tort Immunity

Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Goller v. White. 25 According to
this approach, parental immunity is retained where the allegedly
negligent act involved either the exercise of parental authority or
the exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, or
other care. 12 6 The limited application127approach of Goller has been
adopted by three other jurisdictions.

As with the case-by-case and absence of duty alternatives, 128 the
difficulty inherent in the Goller approach is the maintenance of artificial distinctions under the guise of parental authority or ordinary discretion. Again, as with the other alternatives, these
29
classifications only promote uncertain and inequitable results.
For example, both Wisconsin and Michigan have adopted the Go/ler approach, yet an action against a parent for negligent supervision may be maintained in the former state, 3 0 but not in the
latter.' 3' Furthermore, the same artificial justifications which were
32
advanced in support of parental immunity over ninety years ago
are used to support retention of the exceptions to liability under
the Goller approach. 33 Since these justifications have largely been
rejected, 134 there is no viable rationale for allowing a parent to act
with impunity toward his child merely because the parent's conduct may be described as the exercise of "parental authority" or
"ordinary discretion."

125. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). Goller was the first case to abrogate the
parental immunity doctrine. W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 122, at 904.
126. Goller, 20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
127. Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971); Plumley v. Klein, 388
Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (1972); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Co., 56 N.J. 500,
506-07, 267 A.2d 490, 494 (1970). Minnesota has both adopted and abandoned the holding of Goller. See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968),
overruled, Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980).
128. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
129. See Beal, supra note 5, at 347.
130. Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 261, 201 N.W.2d 825, 832 (1972); Thoreson
v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 246, 201 N.W.2d 745, 753
(1972).
131. Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 484, 233 N.W.2d 46, 48-49
(1975).
132. See supra notes 19-64 and accompanying text.
133. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288,
293 (1971). As one court recently noted, "[r]esort to the temptation of carving out an
exception to the immunity doctrine will only serve to perpetuate the fallacious arguments
which have supposedly supported the doctrine." Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326,
330, 474 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1984).
134. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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D. Elimination of Immunity in Automobile Accident Cases
A fourth alternative to parental immunity partially abrogates
the doctrine by allowing a child to recover damages from his parent for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. 35 The majority of cases abolishing parental immunity for automobile accident36
injuries have relied upon the prevalence of insurance coverage.
Some states, recognizing the effect of insurance on the validity of
parental immunity, have allowed a child to recover damages from
his parent for injuries sustained in an automobile accident only to
the extent of the parent's automobile liability insurance
coverage. 137
This approach fails to consider the legal foundation on which
parental immunity was based.' 38 The existence of insurance, without more, has never before been the basis for recognizing a cause of
action.' 39 The rationale which supports this approach is that when
insurance exists, the suit by the child for injuries will be beneficial
to the family relationship rather than detrimental.140 This rationale does not, however, justify a distinction between automobile accident injuries and other injuries. If the suit is beneficial to the
family relationship when insurance exists, it should not matter how
the child was injured as long as insurance coverage is available to
compensate the child.
Even without considering the effect of insurance, it is unreasonable to allow a cause of action which is dependent upon how a child
is injured. For example, there is no reasonable basis for distinguishing between a child injured in an automobile accident and one
135.

Connecticut and North Carolina allow recovery by statute. CONN. GEN. STAT.
GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1983), amended by Sess. L.
No. 201 (July 17, 1985). Five states allow recovery by common-law decision. Williams
v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1070 (Fla.
1982); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (Okla. 1984); Smith v. Kauffman, 212
Va. 181, 186, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va.
1976).
136. Beal, supra note 5, at 340; see Hollister, supra note 16, at 511.
137. See, e.g., Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1070 (Fla. 1982). Illinois courts, however, have consistently stated that the existence or nonexistence of protective insurance is
not a sound basis for the determination of liability. Wilkocz v. Wilkocz, 124 Ill. App. 3d
904, 912, 464 N.E.2d 1232, 1238 (1984); Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 104, 107, 435
N.E.2d 770, 772 (1982); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 205, 241 N.E.2d 12, 14

§ 52-572 (c) (Supp. 1983-1984); N.C.

(1968).
138. See supra notes 19-64 and accompanying text.
139. See Thuillez, Parental Nonsupervison: The Tort That Never Was, 40 ALB. L.
REV. 336, 349 (1976).
140. Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 724 (W. Va. 1976); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066,
1068-69 (Fla. 1982).
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injured by a metal tipped hunting arrow.' 4 ' In either case, the injured child should be allowed to maintain an action against the
tortfeasor parent. Because of the arbitrariness of abrogating parental immunity only in automobile accident cases, this approach does
not provide a viable alternative to the immunity doctrine.
E.

The Reasonable Parent Standard

The final alternative to parental immunity was announced by the
California Supreme Court in Gibson v. Gibson.'42 The court in Gibson abolished parent-child tort immunity in its entirety. 43 The
court held that the proper test of a parent's conduct asks what a
reasonable and prudent parent would have done in similar circumstances.'" The court refused to accept the rationale, expressed in
Goller v. White, 145 that a parent should be completely immune
from liability in certain areas of child rearing.'46 However, the
court did recognize that the parent-child relationship is unique and
that the traditional concepts of negligence cannot be blindly
applied. 147

The advantages of the reasonable parent standard cannot be denied. This standard recognizes that parents should have more discretion than third parties regarding their conduct toward their
children, yet it permits recovery when parental conduct falls below
the standard of care required for the childrens' protection. 14 8 The
reasonable parent standard does not prevent a parent from exercising ordinary discretion in choosing the appropriate manner in
which to raise his children, yet it provides an injured child with a
cause of action against a parent who fails to provide the care and
guidance which a "reasonable parent" would provide under like
circumstances. As a result, the artificial classifications which grant
a negligent parent total immunity from suit are eliminated. Instead, there develops a comprehensive framework which considers
the rights, liabilities, and duties of parents with respect to their
141. Compare Sixkiller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1984) (metal-tipped arrow);
with Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984) (automobile accident).
142. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
143. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Goller
rationale.
146. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
147. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
148. See Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity in Oklahoma: Some Consideration
for Abandoning The Total Immunity Shield, 12 TULSA L.J. 545, 553 (1977).
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children.' 49
Furthermore a jury, representing a cross-section of the community, can distinguish between appropriate parental discretion and
an unreasonable disregard of parental duty.150 For example, a reasonable parent does not leave a small child alone where he may
play with a dangerous instrumentality.' 5 ' Such conduct can be
readily distinguished from a parent's choices regarding child-raising. For example, a parent must determine the amount of supervision which will best develop a child's individuality and selfreliance. In such a situation, the reasonable parent standard does
not impair the exercise of ordinary parental discretion.
Despite these advantages, however, the reasonable parent standard has been criticized as failing to protect ordinary parental discretion because of the jury's inability to establish a standard of
ordinary parental care given the nation's religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity.' 52 This criticism questions whether the jury system
is an effective or appropriate forum for resolution of disputes between an injured child and an alleged tortfeasor parent. 5 3 Critics
of the reasonable parent standard argue that such disputes should
not be resolved in a judicial forum because the adversarial process
is unable to distinguish between a disregard of parental duty and
the appropriate exercise of parental judgment."'
V.

CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR
EVALUATION OF PARENTAL CONDUCT

Because of the special nature of the parent-child relationship,
149. The development of piecemeal exceptions to the parent-child immunity doctrine
prevents the development of a comprehensive and consistent body of case law to guide
decisions concerning parental conduct. Note, Negligent Supervision and Instruction Protected by Parent-ChildImmunity - Foldi v. Jeffries, 13 SETON HALL L. REv. 398, 39899 (1983). Discarding the doctrine in total would enable the courts to develop more
consistent standards to apply in cases of parent-child tort litigation.
150. As one commentator noted, -[T]he judicial system has proved to be capable of
distinguishing acceptable parental conduct from that which should not be countenanced.
The real need to recognize parental prerogatives does not require that the courts permit
parents to act negligently toward their children with impunity." Hollister, supra note 16,
at 520.
151. See Goedkoop v. Ward Pavement Corp., 51 A.D.2d 542, 378 N.Y.S.2d 417
(1976) (parent left blasting cap in basement; it was found by his infant child). As
Goedkoop illustrates, determinations of reasonable parental conduct are not always
uncertain.
152. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 604 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J.,
dissenting).
153. See Beale, supra note 5, at 354-55.
154. Id.
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state courts have been unable to agree upon the proper standard
for evaluation of parental conduct. This uncertainty has led to uneven results and conflicting precedents. 55 With the exception of
the reasonable parent standard, each alternative to parental immunity retains a class of cases in which the immunity doctrine will be
invoked.15 6 Each of these classifications is based upon criteria
which either have no reasonable basis or cannot be applied in any
meaningful way. Consider, for example, labels such as "family
' 57 "parental control and discipline,''15 or
purposes and objectives,"
"parental supervision."'' 59 These classifications create uncertainty
and promote litigation. Thus, alternatives which retain such distinctions do not promote the interests of both parent and child.
However, difficulty in application does not totally negate the interests which these classifications were intended to protect. The
courts which have adopted the case-by-case approach' 6° illustrate
the concern that without some restraint, a complete elimination of
parental immunity will interfere with the exercise of parental discretion.'16 While this is a legitimate concern, it is not necessary to
retain a limited immunity in order to attain this goal.
A standard which evaluates parental conduct as "prudent" or
"reasonable" necessarily includes parental choice and discretion.
Where that discretion is reasonably exercised, recovery will be denied. Conversely, where the exercise is unreasonable, it is appropriate to hold the parent accountable for resulting injuries. This
accountability should not inhibit parental discretion, but, rather,
should encourage sound parental judgment. Consequently, without specifically excluding parental choice and discretion from consideration, the reasonable parent standard protects the parent in
his exercise of reasonable parental discretion while also protecting
the child from unreasonable parental conduct.
It has been argued that it is difficult to distinguish between a
155. For example, regarding the issue of whether a child may maintain an action
against his parent for negligent supervision, the courts have reached conflicting results.
Some courts permit such claims to be maintained, see, e.g., Aimone v. Walgreen's Co.,
601 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966),
while others refuse to permit such an action. See, e.g., Foldi v. Jefferies, 93 N.J. 533, 461
A.2d 1145 (1983); Middleton v. Nichols, 114 Misc. 2d 596, 452 N.Y.S.2d 157 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1982).
156. See supra notes 112-41 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
158. See Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. 1979).
159. See Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (1980).
160. See supra note 112.
161. See, e.g., Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980)
(refusing to adopt a general standard of liability).
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disregard of parental duty and the appropriate exercise of parental
discretion, and that such determinations should not be made in a
judicial forum. 62 It cannot be denied that certain cases present
courts with difficult questions. Other cases are more clear-cut.
For example, leaving a child alone where he may play with a dangerous instrumentality is clearly a breach of parental duty. 163 In
such a situation, the injured child should not be denied a cause of
action so that courts can avoid more difficult questions of parental
discretion.
Even in difficult situations, the judicial forum is capable of distinguishing between the reasonable exercise of parental discretion
and a neglect of parental duty. I64 Retention of parental immunity,
even in some modified form, is not necessary for court resolution of
this issue. Instead, courts can achieve the proper balance under
the reasonable parent standard by imposing appropriate burdens of
proof.
For example, it is entirely proper for a court, under the reasonable parent standard, to place the burden of persuasion on the
child in cases involving the exercise of parental discretion. Where
the parental conduct is only "arguably unreasonable," or where
there is a "substantial question" of whether the parent acted unreasonably, the jury should find in favor of the parent. Furthermore,
courts should require that the child prove unreasonable parental
16
discretion by clear and convincing evidence. 1
162.
163.

See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
See Sixkiller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1984); Goedkoop v. Ward Pave-

ment Corp., 51 A.D.2d 542, 378 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1976); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247,
201 N.W.2d 825 (1972); Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866
(1970); supra note 151.

164. As one commentator has noted, questions of appropriate parental discretion are
currently resolved by determining whether parental immunity should apply to protect
such discretion. Thus, the parent is currently subjected to "second-guessing" when the
court determines whether the immunity doctrine should absolve the parent from liability.
Note, ParentalImmunity - Merrick v. Sutterlin, 56 WASH. L. REV. 319, 334, 338
(1981). As a result, distinctions between reasonable and unreasonable parental conduct
are currently made when a court determines the applicability of parental immunity. Abolition of parental immunity would shift this decision to a cross-section of the community
especially qualified to make such determinations, namely, the jury. See generally C.
JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 35-38, 64-68 (1962); Clark, The American Jury:
A Justification, in SELECTED READINGS, THE JURY 1 (G. Winters ed. 1962).

165.

The traditional measure of persuasion in civil cases is by a preponderance of the

evidence. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 340, at 959 (3d ed. 1984). There is a

range of claims, however, for which a party must establish his right to recover by clear
and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Buzard v. Griffin, 89 Ariz. 42, 358 P.2d 155 (1961)
(election fraud); Gillock v. Holdaway, 379 Ill. 467, 41 N.E.2d 504 (1942) (establishment
of oral trust on land taken by absolute deed); Steketee v. Steketee, 317 Mich. 100, 26
N.W.2d 724 (1947) (specific performance of oral contract); In re Mazanec's Estate, 204
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The reasonable parent standard, when coupled with these burdens of proof, safeguards parental discretion while allowing recovery for clearly unreasonable parental conduct. By doing so, it
effectively balances the parent's right to decide how to raise his
child and the child's right to be free from unreasonable risks. Additionally, this standard avoids the artificial classifications present
in other alternatives to parental immunity. By using the modified
reasonable parent standard, courts can develop a comprehensive
framework for analysis of the rights, duties and liabilities of parents and their children.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The public policy arguments which have been advanced in support of parental immunity no longer justify retention of the doctrine. Consequently, Illinois and the majority of other
jurisdictions, recognizing the fact that parental immunity is not a
viable solution to parent-child civil litigation, have significantly
limited application of the doctrine. In order to promote a comprehensive framework by which the rights and liabilities of parents
and their children can be developed, Illinois should adopt the reasonable parent standard. Furthermore, in applying the standard to
questions of parental discretion, courts should require the plaintiff
child to meet his burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence. This standard safeguards both a parent's discretion in deciding how to raise a child and a child's right to maintain an action
for unreasonable parental conduct.
DAVID

L. GROBART

Minn. 406, 283 N.W. 745 (1939) (undue influence); Lindley v. Lindley, 67 N.M. 439, 356
P.2d 455 (1960) (oral contracts to make a will). See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a state must offer clear and
convincing evidence of unfitness before parental rights may be cut off. It has been argued
that the clear and convincing standard can be translated simply and intelligibly if the
members of the jury are instructed that they must be pursuaded that the truth of the
contention is "highly probable." McBaine, Burden of Proof- Degreesof Belief, 32 CALIF.
L. REV. 242, 246, 253-54 (1944); E. CLEARY, supra, § 340, at 959-60.

